To narrate oneself is, first of all, a narrative act, an act of language (Ricoeur, 1985) through which one puts words to a part of oneself and gives it expression. The Self never surfaces whole in language, yet it takes shape, filters itself, and reinvents itself as the story and time unfold. When we narrate ourselves, we voice emotions and lived experiences that in turn bear upon both the way we tell our story and the way we perceive it. Bound up with emotion, narrating the self is a form of self-narrative : the telling, or construction, of a personal history that brings forward what is distinctly our own. Such a narrative gives expression to our personal reality, steeped in subjectivity, for it reaches us through our own prism of how lived reality is represented. In narrating ourselves, then, we deliver no immutable essence, but a construction of meaning in which memory and forgetting, truth and fiction, interweave. The self-narrative, in this sense, is not only an expression of what we have been, but a creation of what we believe ourselves to be.

Self-narration takes many forms: autobiographical writing, life narratives (used, among other things, as a technique for investigating the real, as developed by the Chicago School (Thomas & Znaniecki, 1918-1920)), and oral, written, and shared accounts circulating on social media. These modalities of the self-narrative belong to distinct contexts, allowing individuals to share personal experiences, emotions, perspectives, and visions, and to give meaning to what they have lived.

On social media, the self-narrative unfolds through online interactions carried out across various platforms, each with its own interface. According to Fanny Georges, in interacting with the device the user takes form within the structure predetermined by the interface (Georges, 2011, pp. 32-33). Each platform thus imposes a distinct self-representation, since ‘‘ different interfaces produce a diversity of identity stereotypes because they structure as many frames of interaction,’’ self-representation being ‘‘ the set of signs that manifest the user within interactive devices ’’ (Georges, 2011, p. 38). If Discord’s interface does not carry the same codes and signs as Facebook or Instagram, can it then shape the self-narrative ? To examine the self-narrative on Discord and to grasp its many subtleties, we draw on interview excerpts gathered within an interpretive-sociological approach borrowed from Max Weber. By giving voice to those concerned, what is at stake is the meaning individuals attach to the ways they narrate themselves online, and more precisely on Discord.

We therefore propose a cross-reading of narrative intelligence and narrative identity, through the writings of Jérôme Bruner and Boris Cyrulnik. Narrative intelligence is the process by which the meaningful structures of narratives allow us to make sense of lived experience and to understand the world ; narrative identity, for its part, affords the chance to rework one’s own past, along with the representation of the real that we hold of it. Inscribed within the very identity of the individual, the self-narrative thus permits the articulation of sameness and selfhood within narrative identity, as Paul Ricoeur stresses. With a view to understanding how the self-narrative is expressed and transformed on Discord, we will connect the online self-narrative to the sense of a ‘‘blank page’’ that the uses of the interface make possible. This will let us grasp the narrative as a means of expressing the possibilities of the self, taking place in the way one narrates oneself online through personal experiments, but also through confidences and feelings of lightness.

In Making Stories, Jerome Bruner approaches narrative not as a transparent record of reality but as the very medium through which the self comes into being: ‘‘it is through narrative that we create and re-create selfhood, that self is a product of our telling and not some essence to be delved for in the recesses of subjectivity’’ (Bruner, 2003, pp. 85-86). If phenomenology opened a reading of how subjective reality is constructed and of how the individual gives meaning to lived experience, it also shaped Bruner’s writings. This influence allows the psychologist Kenneth J. Gergen to place Bruner’s approach within social constructionism, situated (Dumora & Boy, 2008, p. 7) at the border between psychological constructivist theories and social constructionist ones. In An Invitation to Social Construction, Gergen specifies that ‘‘ where constructivism places the origin of knowledge in the head of the individual, social construction places the origin in social process’’ (Gergen, 2023, p. 32). This is why social constructionism, within which Gergen places himself, along with Bruner, George Herbert Mead, and Lev Vygotsky is defined as a current whose chief emphasis falls on discourse, taken as the site where self and world take shape together and as something that works through social relationships (Gergen, 1999, as cited in Dumora & Boy, 2008, p. 2). In Bruner’s own terms, narrative operates ‘‘as an instrument of mind in the construction of reality’’ (Bruner, 1991, pp. 1-21). What we perceive as reality is thus an outcome of social interaction, of meaning-making, and of narration. This construction of reality proceeds through what the cognitive psychologist calls narrative intelligence : the way individuals use narratives and stories as meaningful frames in order to organise and interpret their realities. Narrative intelligence allows a self-distancing that serves to apprehend the world (Bruner, 2003, p. 78) and to understand the conduct of others. Whether fictional, legal, or literary, narratives constitute for Bruner essential frames that draw on narrative structures to organise experience, interpret events, and give meaning to each person’s reality.

In the same way, the self-narrative mobilises narrative structures centred on lived experiences, emotions and feelings, personal beliefs, and a shared, taken-for-granted cultural belonging. Subjectivity thereby plays a primary role and comes to expression through language and verbalisation : ‘‘ One cannot verbalize experience without taking a perspective, and… the language being used often favors particular perspectives. The world does not present ‘events’ to be encoded in language. Rather, in the process of speaking or writing, experiences are filtered through language into verbalized events’’ (Slobin, 2000, p. 107, as cited in Bruner, 2003, p. 73). Each story is therefore told differently depending on the narrator, but also depending on the interlocutor and the situation in which the individuals are placed.

If narrative identity, for Bruner, foregrounds the construction of individual meaning through the self-narrative, the ‘‘definition of the situation’’, in William Thomas’s sense, underscores the weight of the social environment in how the individual interprets a situation and gives meaning to their own reality (Thomas, 1923, as cited in Grafmeyer & Joseph, 1990). The context, and the interpretation individuals hold of it, thus play a primary role in how the self-narrative takes form and is interpreted. In online interactions, and on social media in particular, the distinctive feature is the ability not only to navigate among different contexts and interlocutors, but also to operate within a situation whose environment is digital.

Organised as a system of invitation-based servers, Discord is a voice- and text-chat platform initially created for online video-game ‘‘communities.’’ Today, with more than 200 million monthly active users worldwide (Discord Inc., 2025), Discord sees a diversity of uses reaching well beyond video games, organised around the interests of each user. The aim is not to generalise about the software’s various uses, but to examine the self-narrative through the online interactions of people who have never met ‘‘ IRL’’ [In Real Life]. Set against ‘‘ real life,’’ the acronym IRL refers to interactions and activities taking place online or in virtual spaces. These carry particular codes that vary across applications, and they afford a degree of freedom that individuals can seize in their self-narration. By choosing a pseudonym and an avatar, the individual selects the name and image that will represent them and form the first "cues" others will perceive. Through interviews with 15 Discord users, ranging from 1,5 to 3 hours, we observed that online interactions on this software rested very little, almost not at all, on exchanging photographs or making video calls.

The bodily dimension seems set aside at first, and may surface later, once relationships settle into duration. While three-quarters of the interviews specify that no exchange of photos or details about physical appearance takes place, it turns out that when an affinity is present and exchanges continue over several months, every respondent reports having seen the other in a photo at least once.

If the software’s interface imposes a particular self-representation according to its devices, the tacit practices among participants also shape how individuals apprehend the situation. Before the exchange of a self-photo, which marks a stage in the relationship, individuals can take hold of a sense of a new identity, blank of all social attributes: a sense of a ‘‘blank page.’’

According to Georg Simmel, the presence of several social circles (family, friendships, the professional world) allows individuals to present themselves under multiple facets. The multiplicity of existing social circles lets individuality develop : ‘‘ Thereby the potential for individualization also grows immeasurably so that the same person in the various circles to which that person concurrently belongs can appropriate entirely different relational positions ’’ (Simmel, 2009, p. 380). The intersection of social circles thus allows a certain freedom : that of letting a part of one’s individuality flourish beyond social control. Discord seems to constitute a social circle in its own right :

The self-narrative proves to be an indicator of a ‘‘ tension ’’ (Bruner, 2003, p. 78) between an ‘‘engagement’’ toward others that binds us to the world and an ‘‘ autonomy ’’ attesting that ‘‘ one has a will of one’s own, a certain freedom of choice, a degree of possibility ’’. This tension between engagement and autonomy in constructing the self-narrative bespeaks a sought-after balance between ‘‘inner’’ sources, which Bruner defines as ‘‘memory, feelings, ideas, beliefs, subjectivity’’, and ‘‘outer’’ sources, bearing on ‘‘ much of self-making is from outside in - based on the apparent esteem of others and on the myriad expectations that we early, even mindlessly, pick up from the culture in which we are immersed ’’ (Bruner, 2003, p. 65).

The self-narrative is thus produced by the individual, drawing on their interpretation and their felt sense of what they have lived and experienced, as well as on their interpretation of the regard or vision others hold of them.

‘‘Telling oneself about oneself is like making up a story about who and what we are, what’s happened, and why we’re doing what we’re doing’’ (Bruner, 2003, p. 64). The autobiographical narrative constitutes a retrospect of the self, a look upon the past with the reflexivity of today’s self. It proves to be a space where the subject’s imaginary unfolds to build links among situations, characters, experiences, successes or failures, fears and anxieties, where romance may win out over fact.

This dialectic between ‘‘ The canonical and the possible are forever in dialectical tension with each other.’’ (Bruner, 2003, p. 13). It allows past and present to exist, but also to explore the various potentialities of existence and to take form through self-narration : ‘‘ how my life has always been and should rightly remain" and ‘‘ how things might have been or might still be.’’ (Bruner, 2003, p. 14). It is through narrative, then, that the various possible situations take shape, and through verbalisation that the individual has the chance to explore the different facets or versions of the self. The self-narrative, the autobiographical narrative, or more broadly the narrative of which we are the object, thus allows multiple possible versions of the self to emerge, putting into words the different possibilities of expressing identity and personal experience. As Bruner observes, ‘‘ we create not just one self-making story but many of them.’’ (Bruner, 2003, p. 64).

In thus envisaging narrative as a means of expressing the possibilities of the self, Bruner conceives the self as ‘‘ constantly construct and reconstruct our selves ’’ (Bruner, 2003, p. 64).

With a sense of a ‘‘ blank page ’’ taking place in online interactions between people who do not know each other IRL, the self-narrative allows a retrospect of the self with a feeling that there is no injunction to sustain engagement toward others.

In observing the interpretation made through the cues others leave, the individual has the option of altering their written discourse, sometimes for sheer pleasure, sometimes through experimentation.

The act of omission is a ‘‘ silent speech act ‘‘ (Lenclud, 2011). By deliberately leaving aside certain information, omission belongs to the self-narrative, for it can help shape and present a certain image one wishes to project of oneself. Interactions carried out in writing on Discord make it possible to omit specifying one’s gender, as is the case for more than half of the women interviewed :

By not using feminine agreement, whether through oversight or as a strategy of self-protection, the respondents let others believe what they want to see and can experiment with being taken for someone of male gender. For Bruner, experimentation resembles play, which is a ‘‘a superb medium for exploration’’ (Bruner, 1986b, pp. 77-83), but also of invention, and which takes on a fictional character of which the protagonists are aware (Bruner, 1986a). By contrast, more than half of the male respondents report lying about their gender in order to experiment, to make ‘‘ jokes ’’, simply for ‘‘ play.’’

Bruner distinguishes play from intentional lying, which involves an intention to manipulate the truth so as to deliberately deceive one’s interlocutor. His definition meets that of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, for whom ‘‘ To lie without benefit or harm to oneself or to others is not to lie : it is not a lie, but a fiction ’’ (Rousseau, 1782, p. 38). If lying by omission about one’s gender would thus constitute a fiction, through the absence of profit and harm, the ‘‘joke’’ extending over time may, for its part, cause harm if the conversations are put to ill use.

That said, the move to spoken discourse lets the individual glimpse a little more of their interlocutor. Minor arrangements such as not specifying one’s gender, whether in a logic of self-protection or simply of experimentation, cannot endure over time. The real body recalls one to reality, and the individual can no longer cheat. The voice betrays the small fictions of the self and recalls the body.

Experiments are not limited to gender, since the respondents, only women here, report having already lied about their age, adding a few years when they were adolescents.

This experimental strategy of ‘‘wanting to be taken seriously’’ belongs to a desire to be regarded as the other’s equal and no longer as a child. Here, the users draw on their real experiences and on the outer sources they generalise in order to meet the expectations of how an older person would behave.

With a wide age gap, the individual plays, experiments, sees how far it will go. Here, she is aware she is 12, but the other trusts her, he will believe her. Verbalising and holding one’s role for a given time allows a version of a possible self to emerge through a self-narrative, a fiction. Playing the self, with the possibility of ‘‘ inventing a life,’’ is made possible through the software’s device. In narrating oneself, fiction is verbalised through language and allows the construction of stories by exploring emotions and situations that differ from each person’s reality. In thus experimenting with different roles, the individual explores their imagination and exercises their understanding of the world through the construction of meaningful narratives.

By tying today’s life to yesterday’s, the self-narrative reinvents the present, but also the future, while redrawing the contours of the past.

Bruner is not alone in stressing the weight of narration and social interaction in the process of self-construction. By mobilising and operationalising the concept of resilience for psychological, sociological, and cultural ends, Boris Cyrulnik spread and made accessible the importance of verbalising, of telling, of narrating oneself both to oneself and to others. In the case of traumatic event(s), the autobiographical narrative allows a resilience through language, with ‘‘ the possibility of reworking the representation of reality through the narrative one makes of it ’’ (Cyrulnik, 2018). Verbalising, putting words to things, allows what he calls a ‘‘ degree of freedom ’’ or, on the contrary, a ‘‘ degree of harm ’’ through silence. This degree of freedom is expressed through ‘‘ a convergence of causes, which can repair the facts, cancel them out ’’, while the degree of malefice ‘‘ aggravates them, if one has lost the capacity to judge, and to elaborate verbally so as to make of them a shared narrative ’’ (Cyrulnik, 2018). Narratives allow us not only to give meaning to our experiences, but also authorise a process of reconstructing our personal history. In narrating oneself, the other plays a part in what Cyrulnik calls the ‘‘ surrounding narratives ’’. These designate the narratives that individuals make of a subject’s autobiographical discourse, with the consequence of modifying the representation of the trauma. It is through the surrounding narratives that the representation of what happened to us is modified. Thus, ‘‘ autobiography, or self-narrative, is not the return of the past as it was ; it is the representation of that past reality that allows us to re-identify ourselves and to seek the social place that suits us ’’ (Cyrulnik, 2003, p. 153).

If the interface and devices of Discord afford individuals a sense of a ‘‘ blank page ’’, of being able to narrate themselves within a new social circle in its own right, they sometimes authorise the possibility of confiding without risk of consequences.

It is a social sphere not in direct contact with the real. Narrative identity seems able to deploy itself without ‘‘ fear ’’ of the other’s judgement ; one weighs one’s words less, one is less ‘‘ afraid ’’ of social consequences. There is a dimension of lightness, underscored by half of the respondents, made possible by a device inscribed in the virtual.

When the relationship does not seem to match expectations, it is possible to undo the ties one has woven, and this with a simple mouse click. In Les liaisons numériques. Vers une nouvelle sociabilité ?, Antonio Casilli holds that changing a ‘‘ flesh-and-blood friendship ’’ is socially costly: it ‘‘ requires changing one’s codes, one’s style, one’s schedule ’’ (Casilli, 2010, p. 278), whereas changing a friendship originating in the digital sphere happens in a few clicks, which produces a distancing between self and other, a lesser emotional and affective investment. It is easier to confide, to reveal aspects of one’s personality or acts one judges shameful, to someone one does not know, someone one can ‘‘delete’’ from one’s relations, as one would wish to erase a bad memory.

The constraint of presence disappears; maintaining face, in Goffman’s sense, is no longer a necessity, since it is possible to delete the person from one’s relations. The individual frees themselves from social control by entering a new sphere, and grants themselves leave to open up, to confide in a stranger, to ease their conscience without risk of feeling devalued. The user ‘‘ lets go,’’ expresses themselves on the impulse of the moment, without dreading the other’s gaze : the relationship is ephemeral, and they have the guarantee, in appearance, that it will not insinuate itself into their real life.

This feeling of an absence of consequences brings out the possibility of disregarding the surrounding narratives in the work of reappropriating the real. With the possibility of confiding without facing consequences, by means of a right-click to delete the other from one’s circle, it is no longer necessary to take into account what others think of us.

The ephemeral aspect of the relationship allows one to make a self-narrative without fear of judgement or of having to answer to ‘‘ the apparent esteem of others ’’, echoing Paul Ricoeur’s keeping of the promise.

For Paul Ricoeur, narrative identity is a dialectical relation between sameness and selfhood, established through the narrative of the Self. The distinction between these two senses of identity rests chiefly on time and on whether or not an identifiable character is taken into account. Identity¹ in the sense of idem posits a ‘‘ core,’’ (Ricoeur, 1992) identifiable over time as certain characteristics proper to an individual that remain fixed and allow their identification. Identity in the sense of ipse, by contrast, carries in Latin ‘‘ the meaning of ‘ myself ’, ‘ yourself ’, ‘ himself ’ […] ‘me, you, him, and no other’ ’’ (Joffre, 2010). In other words, ipse designates the singular identity that we cannot attach to the permanent, identifiable core that identity in the sense of idem constitutes.

Identity is thus made up of this ‘‘ core ’’, or this sameness, but also of selfhood, which permits ‘‘ self-constancy ’’ (Ricoeur, 1992, p. 124), with the consequence that we are ourselves and not another. Sameness, however, is a twofold notion : it is understood as the sum of characteristics, such that a group of individuals identifies as alike, united through others, but also as different from others. Selfhood, for its part, takes a strictly individual path, holding all the characteristics and distinctions that make us ourselves and not another, beyond resemblance and beyond belonging or reference to a group, a tribe, a nation, or a profession.

It is these two ‘‘ significations ’’ of identity that constitute the modalities of the ‘‘ permanence of the self ’’ or the ‘‘maintenance of the self,’’ sustaining a dialectical relation between them by virtue of what Ricoeur designates as narrative identity. The existentialist approach meets sameness and selfhood at this point, for it allows identity to be perceived as in flux while preserving a base, a permanent core. It is therefore through narrative identity that Ricoeur perceives a dialectical relation uniting the two dimensions of idem and ipse in response to the constitution of the self present in personal identity, which ‘‘can be articulated only in the temporal dimension of human existence ’’ (Ricoeur, 1992, p. 114). What is at stake is the constitution, but also the maintenance, of the self over time, which is subject to a gradual transformation.

Ricoeur illustrates this with ‘‘ the keeping of the promise ’’, projecting the individual into the future despite any change to which they might be subject : ‘‘ keeping one’s promise, […] does indeed appear to stand as a challenge to time, a denial of change : even if my desire were to change, even if I were to change my opinion or my inclination, ‘ I will hold firm ’ ’’ (Ricoeur, 1992, p. 124).

Influenced notably by the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger, Ricoeur belongs to a hermeneutic approach to understanding and interpretation, attending to how the interpretations of narratives, symbols, and texts shape and contribute to the understanding of self and of the surrounding world. This ‘‘ hermeneutic turn of phenomenology ’’ (Grondin, 2017) brings to light the weight of language and narration in shaping the understanding of the world, taking into account the hermeneutic dimension of culture. Interpretations and significations of the world are, among other things, influenced by the internalised systems of cultural meaning. In his hermeneutic approach, Ricoeur also examines the role of language and symbols in the construction of meaning. Like Bruner and Cyrulnik, Ricoeur notes the weight of subjectivity expressed through narrative and therefore through language, shaping the way we interpret and give meaning to experience. Within the narrative of the self, narrator and character merge into a single ‘‘ I ’’ ; what Ricoeur terms an ‘‘ identifying reference,’’ which confers uniqueness and thereby identity; the self appears, in his words, ‘‘at the junction of acting and the agent ’’ (Ricoeur, 1992, p. 112). In keeping with the promise, the individual commits to others, but also to themselves, to hold to their decision despite a change of self (Samama, 2005).

The individual projects themselves into time, through narrative identity, and commits to others, which allows a maintenance of the self. In claiming to be the ‘‘ same ’’ IRL and on Discord, whatever their pseudonym, and all that this entails as possibility for self-expression, they express a feeling of honesty toward themselves and others. That said, Ricoeur distinguishes moral obligation from ‘‘ the specific discursive act of promising ’’ (Assayag, 2016), since he holds that a broken promise remains a promise (Ricoeur, 1992). While half of the respondents stress the possibility of confiding and breaking off the relationship at any moment without commitment or promise, the other half insist on their maintenance of the self and on the trust present in their relationships.

Closely tied to the process of self-recognition, trust belongs to the subject’s identity dynamic through narrative identity. Recognition, or ‘‘ this return of the self upon itself by way of the detour through otherness reveals trust to be at once the aim and the condition of possibility, the premise and the consequence, of mutual recognition’’ (Assayag, 2016). Persistence over time thus implies a temporal coherence in the self-narrative that gradually becomes a mutual recognition, of both self and other.

If Bruner approaches narrative through narrative structures in the understanding and representation of the world and of oneself, Cyrulnik takes a particular interest in the narrative reconstruction of traumatic experiences and of social bonds in the development of the individual. Both approach the self-narrative through narration, whether by way of narrative intelligence or narrative identity: what is at stake is the reworking of the representation of reality and the rearrangement of the very identity of the subject who narrates themselves. Self-narration constitutes an opportunity to explore and express identity, where the continuity of being (sameness) and subjectivity as the expression of each person’s uniqueness (selfhood) come to be articulated.

In a world where social media play an ever more important role and settle into our daily lives, the self-narrative evolves and finds occasion to reinvent itself across the various software interfaces. The individual can experiment with others, confide without concern for consequences, sharpen their understanding of the world, or weave relationships that endure over time. By mastering the tacit codes and uses of online interactions, individuals make the choice to exist by narrating themselves, where the self-narrative expresses a will to live, to share with others their personal stories, their lived experience, and their understanding of the world draped in their own subjectivity.

Notes

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